can be expressed as incongruity. Incongruity is the difference between intemal complexity of a learning system and the complexity of the context. Traditional concepts of information processing are models of homeostasis on a basic level without learning. Activity and the irreversible learning process arc driving forces that cause permanently in-homeostasis in the relationship between a learning system and his context. A suitable model for information processing of learning systems must be conceptualised on a higher level: a homeostatic model of 'in-homeostasis', A concept to information processing is presented that derives an inverted U-shaped function between incongruity and information. This concept leads to some design recommendations for man-machine systems.
INTRODUCTION
We can find in the literature different interpretations of the term 'information'. Several approaches from different point of views are done to clarify 'information' (see [Rauterberg 1995a] , [Topsae 19741, [Volz 19911 [Korn- wachs 19961): (1) information as a message (syntax); (2) information as the meaning of a message (semantic); (3) information as the effect of a message (pragmatic); (4) information as a process; (5) inlormation as knowledge; (6) information as an entity of the world. If we try to apply information theory to human behavior, then we have to integrate activity, perception, and 1 ing. In lhis proposal we are looking for an interpre of 'information', which is compatible with concepts of activity and learning. Going t the paradox of 'new' informa and after the reception Different concepts are 'solve' this paradox (see
ACTIVITY AND P
Neisser [Neisser 19761 was on who tried 10 integrate activity, perception, and learning. tic emphasised that human experience depends on the stored menial schemata, which guide explorative behavior and the perception of an external context. Learning increases constantly the complexity of the mental model (cspecially the structure of the cognitive knowledge base). This is an irreversible process [Bateson 19721 . One conscquence of this irreversibility is, that the conlextual complexity must increase appropriately to fit the human's needs for optimal variety and stimulation. Action regulation theory offers a coherent body of principles for human-centered task and work design [Hacker 1994 Hellpach ([Hellpach 19221, p. 27) Control with feedback on results and the possibility of checking the results of one's own actions against the set goals. Inconiplete activities--or partialized actions--"lack, to a large extent, possibilities for independent goal-setting and decision-making. for developing individual work stylcs or sufliiciently precise feedback" ( [Hacker 19871, p. 35) . Complete activities (or tasks) offer the possibility of setting goals and sub-goals, as well as of offering decision-making possibilities during the various phases of tahk complction, and therefore provide latitude of activity or action. Complete activities are therefore becoming fundamental for realising the concept of action regulation. Goals are organised in a hierarchical tree structure [Hacker 19861 . The complete action cycle (see Figure 3 ) has a fractal or recursive structure: Each component of the complete action cycle can be analysed with an embedded and subordinated action cycle. Chunking occurs ovcr Lconteyev's all three levels (see Figure 4) . "Action Theory seems to be an integrative long-term approach that is still developing especially with the development of hierarchically subordinate sub approaches. Action Theory is still more a heuristic broad-range I'ramcwork than a final theory. . . . The integrative power of Action Theory will bridge some interrelated gaps: the gap hctwccn cognition (and knowledge) and action, the gap hctwccn cognition and motivation (see goal odentation), and even the gap between basic and more applied approaches ..." (IHacker 19941, p. 113) .
Our main research interest is bridging both gaps. (ad 1)
The sum of all cognitions are determined by the mental knowledge. Learning is a permanent process that is regulatcd by optiniising the external complexity based on actions. (ad 2) An self regulated system maximise his information processing by optimising the situational incongruity.
WHAT IS A LEARNING SYSTEM?
The brain is the operating system for human cognitions. One part--probably the most important part--of a human brain is the memory with all stored and strictly organised knowledge. But, there very few learning theories that can describe and explain metalearning phenomenons (e.g., learning from experience) [Weinert I9841 [Tuijnman 19921 . One of the most powerful concept was introduced by Gregory Bateson /Bateson 19721.
Bateson developed the concept of "deutero learning" to describe metalearning phenomenons ("learning to learn" [Bateson 19721 ). The basic idea of this concept is that the variety on one level can be reduced to its invariant structure. This invariant structure forms the next higher, more abstract level of learning. Dcutero learning can appear on five different hierarchical levels: Level-0: The perception of a specific situation leads directly to a specific reaction. Learning on the level means that a system shows different activities in dcpendency of the perceived situational context; no correction or change in the same situation can be observed. This deutero learning type is possible for all living systems. Level-1: Dependent on the assessment of the outcome adaptive behavior can be observed in a given set ol' alternative actions; after erroneous hehavior corrections are possible by selecting an alternative action. The system learns to choose the correct element in a given set of elements. Level-I deutero learning includes habituation, classical conditioning, extinction, etc..
Level-2:
Learning on this level includes two types of adaptive behavior: first, selecting the correct set of actions in a given meta-set of sets of actions, and second, interpreting the own learning history in a difl'erent way. The sum of all deutero learning on level-2 is often described in concepts like personality, character, etc.. Level-3: If a living system changes (reorganises, resp.) its internal structure in a fundamental way then a level-3 deutero learning process took place. Level-3 deutero learning includes a conscious way of changing the own personality (e.g., psycho therapy). Level-4: Learning on this level means adaptive behavior on an ontological or genetic level. This level is not controllabel by an individuum.
If we look from a very general perspective on living systems (e.g., individuals, groups, organisations, etc.), we can compare all these different systems from an abstract learn theoretical view. Each leaniirrg systrrii must have: (1) the possibility to plan actions and to execute them, (2) a storage (e.g., individual memory, shared group memory, anecdotes, etc.), ( 3 ) the possibility to evaluate the own behavior with excess to the storagc, and (4) the possibility to include the assessment into the future action planning and execution (see Figure 4) .
evaluation of the own history action planning and execution
We discuss learning of indivi tan1 difference between beginners and experts is complexity of their mental model [Bainbridge 19 The beginners have a simple have to behave in a more heu an unknown context. On the of the mental model of the ex rect representations of the context structure, so they can behave efficicntly to reach their goals. We therefore assume that the mental model of an expert is more comprehensive than that of a beginner. This assumption can be tested by comparing the complexity of the observable processes of beginners and experts.
Thc empirical results in [Rauterberg 19931 indicate, th the complexity (AC, see Figure 1 ) of the observable processes of beginners is larger than the complexity of cxpcrts. Therefore we concluded that the behavioral coinplexity is negatively correlated with the complexity o f the underlying mental model (MC, see Figure 1 ). Thus it is possible to estimate the cognitive complexity hascd on the measurement of the behavioral complexity and based on the measurement of the contextual (environmental, rcsp.) complexity (EC, see Figure 1) [Rau-
Reviewing several articles about complexity in different research fields we found two dimensions of complexity [Fliickiger 19951 : breadth and depth complexity. The l~redrli cor?iplexity is the most common interpretation (e.g., number of' elements). An often ne problem of breadth complexity is the underlying tion that all elements have a similar amount of complexity of the a1 structure, so they
HOW TO MEASURE BEHAVIORAL COMPLEXITY
Following the action theoreti framework we are able to analyse the continuously recorded stream of the observable operations. In the context of human-computer interaction this can be done very easily by the logfile recording technique [Rau 931. What is the main concern of a user inter h a technical system? The user must build up a mental representation of the system's structure and gain knowledge about the task relevant functions of this system. Furthermore, he must learn the "language", i.e., a set of symbols, their syntax, ;ind opcr:itions connected to t evoke action sequcnccs (thc inter-active "proc lated to task and sub-titsk functions (goal and s Figure 4 . The different components of a learning system -2278 -Given a finite action space, each sta system context, and each transiti other corresponds to a human o quence) of states and operations action hpace describes a comple ing process. Each finite trace in the action space is called a "process". Each task solving process contains three different kinds bf information: ( I ) all necessary states and operations itself, (2) the amount of rcpctition of each state and operation, and (3) the sequential order of all these states and operations.
Finite state transition nets can be completely described with Petri nets, which have a clear semantic [Peterson 19811 . A Petri net is a mathematical structure consisting of two non-empty disjoint sets of nodes, called S-clcments and T-elements, respectively, and a binary relation F, called the flow relation. F connects only nodcs of different types and leaves no node isolated. Pctri ncts can be interpreted by using a suitable pair of concepts for the sets S (signified by a circle "( )") and T (signified by a square "[ I") and a suitable interpretation for the flow relation F (signified by an arrow " -> ' I ) . The means/activity interpretation allows one to describe the static structure of a system with several active and passive functional components: means (S) = rcal or informational entity, and transitions [TI = (repeatable) operations (actions, resp.). The flow relation F signifies: lo] -> (m), the operation '0' (e.g., a user command) produces means 'm' (e.g., a system state); (m) -> lo], opera-
The main relations between two different ncts or processes are abstraction, embedding and folding [Gcnrich 19801 . The 'folding' relation is thc Brrsic idea of our approach [Rauterberg 19931 . Folding a process means to map S-elements onto S-elements and T-elements onto T-elements while keeping the F-structure. The aini ol' the 'folding' relation is to reduce the elements of an ohserved empirical task solving process to the minimum number of states and transitions. This reduced numbcr of elements can be interpreted as the performatice rret.
Folding a sequential task solving process extracts the embedded net structure and neglects the inforniation o f the amount of repetition and of the sequential order. This 'extracted' and generated Petri net is the minimal net to reproduce the observed process [Rautcrbcrg 1995b] . We interpret this 'folded' Pctri net as a structural description of a complete task solving process. transitions). The parameter P is a constant that corrects the result of Formula I in the case of a sequcncc (#F -(#S + #T) = -I); the value of P in this context is I . The semantic of Ccycle can be described by the number o f "holes", "loops", "cycles" or "independent decisions". "Cyclomatic number":
But, what can we do with this kind of metric?
Ccycle := #F -(#S + #T) + P with P=l
ACTIVITY AND INCONGRUITY
Weilskker [Weizsacker 19741 distinguished in his concept of 'information' between two dimensions: (1 .) 'Singularity of the first time', and (2.) confirmation and redundancy. For both aspects we can find two different research traditions in psychology: ( I ) novelty and curiosity ([Berlyne 19601, [Hunt 19631, [Voss 1981]) , and (2) dissonance theory ( [Festinger 19571, [Frey 19811 ).
Both rcscarch tracks are only loose coupled till today.
Investigators of novelty assume, that living systems (like mammals, especially humans) are motivated by an information seeking bchavior. In situations, which are charilctcrized by sensory deprivation, mammals and humans arc intrinsically looking for stimulation. They incrcasc the coniplexity of the context or the perception of it. On the other side, mammals try to avoid situations with a high amount of stimulation, dissonance, or stress. Hunt (Hunt 19631 The central question--but till now unsolved--question is the relationship between EC on one side and AC and MC on the other side. With the "cyclomatic number" Ccycle we are able to measure AC [Rauterberg 19931. But, how does the perceived external complexity depend on the human's activity and mental schemata? We assume that EC must be a function of AC and MC: EC = pf(MC, AC): This unknown function pf must contain the full potential of perception of the contextual pattern complexity (e.g., the semantic of a situation with distinguishable elements).
As a first step to answer the question 'how to measure EC' we carried out an empirical investigation.
PERCEPTION AND COMPLEXITY
The modern discussion of information and complexity in the context of physics (cf. [Zurek 19911 ) is based on the following paradox: Nearly all measures of informa-tion increase monotonoudly with complexity of the stimulus pattern [Grassberger 19861 . But, the subjective impression of each observer is that a medium amount of entropy in contextual patterns contains the maximum o f information, and not the pattern with zero or with the maximum of entropy! There must be an inverted Ushaped function between subjective 'information' and the information measured by entropy or complexity. low granularity e whole screen as high granularlty Figure 6 . The possible range of perceivable complexity (i.e., the external complexity EC) caused by the level of granularity.
To find out on which level of granularity visual pattern are classified as single "objects" (see Figurc 6) . a qucstionnaire with eight different screen-dumps of a commercial multimedia information system (called "mockups", see [Rauterberg 1995~1 ) was answered by a heterogeneous group of potential users. A total of 33 women (between 14 and 66 year of life) and 33 rnen (between 21 and 55 year of life) participated (no significant difference in age between both groups). The computer experience of each subject was measured on a rating scale ("no experience" = 0 . . . "expert" = 90). We found a significant difference in coniputcr experience between both groups: 40 f 2 7 for women, and 63 +24 for men (p5 .001); the men were more experienced than the women.
To measure the granularity level subjects were instructed to answer a "simple" question: Estimate the nuinher of different perceived object on the screendunip! The range of the estimated granularity lies between 2 and 35 perceived objects for women and between 3 and 30 objects for men. We can find a significant difference between both groups (Xwomen = 9.9 k6.3 objects, Xinen = 12.0 35.1 objects , T-test, p l . cnccd inen estimated more dist (MC, see Figure 1 ) corr ccived external complexity (EC). Overall we assume a reverse u-curve as the summarise coherence between incongruity and information (see F gure 8, cf. [Yerkes 19081 [Streufert 19781 ). I
ACTIVITY AND
tins to hchave for a while in a total fixed a contexr and he has a normal learning rate, then he mus start i m w~g r t i i t y increasing actions [Berlyne 19601 This can bc done on two different ways: (1) increasing the complexity of the context (the perception of it, rcsp.), and/or (2) reducing the CO model. Way ( 2 ) implies the pos (dccrcasc learning rate) or th ccption mechanisms (supp I99Sal).
c t Figure 8 . The summarised coherence between positive pruiry and informaiion (see [Rauterberg 1995al ).
EC and the activity complexity AC: It depends on the -2280 -actual amount of the ihcongruity IC! If IC is grcater than an individual threshold then wc will lind a uep'tiiv correlation between EC and AC. On the other side, if IC is less than an individual threshold then we predict a positive correlation between EC and AC (see Figure 9) . Finally we can conclude that it could be possible to measure "information" in an observer depcritlcnt way. The actual processed amount of information can bc cxactly the same for totally diFferent learning systems i n very different learning stages: It depends o n the complexity of the internal knowledge, the systems activities, and the perceivable action space in the actual lcarning environment. The most critical factor is the lecrrrritrg rate of the system (see Figure 5 ) !
